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Abstract 
This study examines whether and under what conditions voluntary disclosure quality plays 
an information-leveling role in facilitating investment efficiency. Measuring voluntary 
disclosure quality as the (inverse) standard deviation of managers’ prior earnings forecast 
errors (i.e., management forecast consistency), we document a positive association 
between management forecast consistency and investment efficiency that strengthens when 
the information environment becomes more constrained and when there are negative 
shocks to financial reporting quality. We also find that the management forecast 
consistency/investment efficiency association strengthens when firms are younger, faster 
growing, and financially constrained, but not when firms are weakly governed and 
financially unconstrained, which suggests that voluntary disclosure quality facilitates 
investment efficiency by mitigating adverse selection (but not moral hazard) frictions. Last, 
when we employ a changes-based model, we find that increases in management forecast 
consistency are associated with increases in investment efficiency, which mitigates 
concerns that voluntary disclosure quality’s empirical link to investment efficiency is 
purely driven by managers’ inherent forecasting abilities. Overall, we show that voluntary 
disclosure quality can facilitate investment efficiency when financial reporting and other 
elements of the information environment are constrained in their ability to mitigate market 
frictions that impede efficiency.  
     





1.  Introduction 
Prior research identifies information asymmetry between firms and external suppliers 
of capital as a key impediment to efficient capital investment. Information asymmetry 
impedes investment efficiency because capital suppliers are limited in their capacity to 
identify and monitor firms’ investment activities, which creates market frictions such as 
adverse selection and moral hazard. Biddle and Hilary (2006) and Biddle, Hilary, and Verdi 
(2009) find that financial reporting quality can mitigate market frictions and increase 
investment efficiency by leveling the information playing field between firms and capital 
suppliers. However, financial reporting may be constrained in its information-leveling 
abilities for various reasons, including operating volatility (Bhattacharya, Desai, and 
Venkataraman 2013), reporting complexity (Guay, Samuels, and Taylor 2016; 
Balakrishnan, Blouin, and Guay 2019) and negative shocks to information quality (Gleason, 
Jenkins, and Johnson 2008; Kravet and Shevlin 2010). To the extent that information 
intermediaries and monitoring agents cannot compensate for firms’ reporting deficiencies, 
market frictions may persist and ultimately curtail profitable investment opportunities, 
thereby reducing firm- and macro-level investment efficiency.  
When firms operate in constrained information environments, theoretical research 
predicts that managers will seek to resolve information problems through voluntary 
disclosure (Verrecchia 1990, 2001). Empirical evidence supports this prediction and 
suggests that voluntary disclosure can alleviate information transparency issues 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2019) and improve liquidity in firms’ shares (Balakrishnan, Billings, 
Kelly, and Ljungqvist 2014). As these outcomes are consistent with voluntary disclosure 
serving an information-leveling purpose, a natural question arises as to whether voluntary 
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disclosure plays a similar role to financial reporting in facilitating investment efficiency, 
particularly when the broader information environment is constrained in its ability to 
mitigate market frictions that impede investment efficiency. In this study, we examine this 
question and we predict that as the information environment becomes more constrained, 
voluntary disclosure quality becomes more instrumental in facilitating investment 
efficiency through information leveling.  
While our analysis employs a conventional proxy for investment efficiency, our 
proxy for voluntary disclosure quality is relatively novel. Specifically, we follow Hilary, 
Hsu, and Wang (2014) and measure voluntary disclosure quality as the (inverse) standard 
deviation of managers’ prior earnings forecast errors, hereafter referred to as management 
forecast consistency (MFC). Hilary et al. (2014) show that investors and analysts are more 
responsive to management forecasts when prior MFC is higher and that this effect is more 
economically significant and statistically robust than the effect of prior management 
forecast accuracy (MFA). A key advantage to using MFC as our voluntary disclosure 
quality proxy is that, by measuring the second moment of management forecast errors, it 
captures the precision of managers’ disclosure signals. Precision is a defining attribute of 
information quality in theoretical disclosure models (Verrecchia 2001) and precision is 
routinely used in empirical studies when conceptualizing and operationalizing financial 
reporting and disclosure quality (Biddle et al. 2009; Ng 2011; Bhattacharya, Ecker, Olsson, 
and Schipper 2012; Roychowdhury, Shroff, and Verdi 2019). 1  Thus, there is strong 
                                                 
1 Biddle et al. (2009) define financial reporting quality as “the precision with which financial reporting 
conveys information about the firm’s operations, in particular its expected cash flows, that inform equity 
investors” (pp. 113). In their empirical analysis linking financial reporting quality to investment efficiency, 
Biddle et al. (2009) use two second moment measures (both capturing accruals quality) to proxy for financial 
reporting quality.   
3 
 
theoretical and empirical appeal to using MFC as the focal measure of voluntary disclosure 
quality in our study.2 
Using a sample of U.S. publicly traded firms from 1998 to 2017, we begin our 
analysis by examining the baseline association between MFC and investment efficiency. 
We find that high MFC firms (i.e., firms with high voluntary disclosure quality) invest 
more efficiently in capital expenditures than low MFC firms. This result holds even after 
we control for a battery of variables that capture potential confounding factors such as 
financial reporting quality, managerial forecasting ability, and corporate governance.  
After documenting a baseline association between MFC and investment efficiency, 
we then examine whether this association strengthens as the information environment 
becomes more constrained. Using a variety of cross sectional attributes to measure 
information environment constraints, we find that the MFC/investment efficiency 
association strengthens when attributes indicate poorer environments (e.g., lower accruals 
quality, higher earnings and cash flow volatility, smaller firm size, lower analyst following). 
These results suggest that voluntary disclosure quality facilitates investment efficiency 
when outsiders are more constrained in their ability to identify and monitor firms’ 
investment activities, consistent with voluntary disclosure quality mitigating these 
constraints through information leveling.  
Next, we examine whether the MFC/investment efficiency association strengthens 
following negative shocks to accounting quality. Gleason, Jenkins, and Johnson (2008) and 
Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find that investors’ perceptions of a firm’s accounting quality 
                                                 
2 While we do not use MFA as our focal measure of voluntary disclosure quality, we control for the effect of 
MFA throughout our empirical analysis because MFA could capture managers’ inherent forecasting abilities. 
We discuss the potential confounding effect of managers’ inherent forecasting abilities later in the 
introduction.    
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decline when industry peer firms restate their earnings, which suggests that restatements 
trigger accounting contagion effects that lead investors to question the quality of financial 
statements throughout the industry. In such cases, voluntary disclosure quality may serve 
as a substitute for financial reporting quality as an information-leveling mechanism. 
Consistent with this idea, we find that the MFC/investment efficiency association 
strengthens in the two years following peer restatement events relative to the two 
immediately preceding years.  
With evidence that the MFC/investment efficiency association strengthens in weak 
information settings, we next examine whether the association strengthens for firms that 
are prone to investment distortions because of market frictions (adverse selection or moral 
hazard) that arise in such settings. Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng, Dhaliwal, and Zhang 
(2013) find that financial reporting quality curbs under-investment (over-investment) 
among firms that are financially constrained (unconstrained). These results are consistent 
with financial reporting quality faciliting investment efficiency by improving outsiders’ 
ability to identify and direct capital toward good investments as well as to monitor 
managers with the means to pursue bad investments. If voluntary disclosure quality 
provides similar benefits in constrained information environments, then the 
MFC/investment efficiency association should strengthen for financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms. Using financial resource availability measures adapted from Biddle 
et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013), we find the the MFC/investment efficiency relation 
strengthens for financially constrained firms, but not for financially unconstrained firms. 
We also perform tests that examine whether the MFC/investment efficiency association 
strengthens for young and growing firms (i.e., firms that rely heavily on external funding 
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for investment) as well as for weakly governed firms (i.e., firms with poor monitoring of 
investment activities). We find that the MFC/investment efficiency association strengthens 
for young and growing firms, but not for weakly governed firms. Collectively, these results 
suggest that voluntary disclosure quality is more influential in facilitating investment 
efficiency when firms are more likely to have high demand for external capital, but they 
do not suggest that voluntary disclosure quality significantly deters wasteful investment. 
Thus, our evidence is consistent with voluntary disclosure quality mitigating adverse 
selection frictions that impede investment efficiency, but not moral hazard frictions.  
Goodman, Neamtiu, Shroff, and White (2014) argue that the quality of managers’ 
public earnings forecasts is likely to capture the quality of their private forecasts of 
investment project payoffs. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that managers 
with more accurate earnings forecast track records make higher quality investment 
decisions. Thus, a potential alternative explanation of our results is that managers’ broader 
forecasting abilities (rather than information leveling) drive the observed relations between 
MFC and investment efficiency. Although we control for the effect of accuracy in our 
empirical tests, we also perform two additional tests that provide further control for the 
effect of managers’ forecasting abilities. First, we estimate a changes-based specification 
of our baseline model and we find that increases in MFC are associated with increases in 
investment efficiency. Second, we repeat all of our levels-based tests after adding the 
managerial ability score developed in Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) as an additional 
control variable and our results continue to hold. Collectively, these results mitigate 
concerns that voluntary disclosure quality’s empirical link to investment efficiency is 
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purely driven by managers’ broader forecasting abilities.3   
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we contribute to 
the literature on the determinants of investment efficiency by identifying a new channel 
through which management forecast quality links to investment efficiency. Whereas 
Goodman et al. (2014) show that such a link can arise because forecast quality can proxy 
for the quality of capital budgeting decisions, we show that such a link can also arise when 
forecast quality contributes to information leveling between firms and capital suppliers. 
Information leveling is commonly implicated as the channel linking financial reporting 
quality to investment efficiency (e.g., Bens and Monahan 2004; Biddle and Hilary 2006; 
Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 2009; 
Cheng et al. 2013) and our results suggest that voluntary disclosure quality can similarly 
facilitate investment efficiency when the broader information environment is sufficiently 
constrained. Thus, our results align with disclosure incentives analyzed in theoretical 
studies (e.g., Fishman and Haggerty 1989; Verrecchia 2001) and they have important 
implications for firms that are prone to adverse selection problems (e.g., young, growing, 
and financially constrained firms).      
Second, we contribute to a literature that examines the consequences of managers’ 
forecasting track records (e.g., Williams 1996; Hutton and Stocken 2009; Yang 2012; Ng, 
Tuna, and Verdi 2013; Hilary et al. 2014). Prior studies in this area find that investors and 
analysts react more strongly and more quickly to management forecasts when prior 
forecasts are more accurate or consistent, which suggests that prior accuracy and 
                                                 
3 Our analysis should not be interpreted as suggesting that forecasting skill does not improve investment 
efficiency (we strongly believe that it does). Nor should one view our analysis as a “horse race” between 
consistency and accuracy in terms of their respective abilities to “predict” investment efficiency.   
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consistency build forecast credibility. Indeed, some of these studies find that forecasting 
track records are especially influential when information uncertainty among investors is 
high (Hutton and Stocken 2009; Yang 2012). We extend this line of research by showing 
that past forecast consistency (MFC) is positively associated with investment efficiency, 
particularly in weaker information environments where forecast credibility is likely to 
matter more. Thus, our results suggest that the benefits of high quality forecast track 
records extend to real operational outcomes.    
Third, we shed light on a specific channel through which MFC affects a firm’s 
welfare. Hilary, Hsu, and Wang (2016) link MFC to higher profitability and firm value, but 
the way in which MFC facilitates these outcomes is unclear. Our results suggest that MFC 
may enhance performance and valuation by facilitating greater investment efficiency. We 
also show that the quality effect of MFC for quarterly forecasts extends to annual forecasts, 
which suggests MFC can be used to analyze settings where data is available on an annual 
(rather than quarterly) basis (e.g., audit quality, managerial incentives, segment reporting).  
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our research design, sample, and data sources. 
Section 4 reports the main empirical results. Section 5 presents results of additional 
analyses and robustness tests. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2.  Background and hypothesis development 
Investment frictions and financial reporting quality 
Information asymmetry between firms and external suppliers of capital gives rise to 
market frictions that can impede capital investment efficiency (Jensen and Meckling 1976; 
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Myers and Majluf 1984; Jensen 1986). One type of friction, moral hazard, arises when 
incentive misalignment between managers and outsiders leads to suboptimal investment 
from the perspective of shareholders. Another type of friction, adverse selection, arises 
when managers are able to exploit their informational advantage over outsiders and seek 
capital when capital suppliers overvalue the firm. To the extent that the information 
environment does not allow capital suppliers to identify and monitor firms’ investment 
activities, market frictions can lead to over-investment when managers are self-interested 
and/or opportunistic or under-investment when suppliers respond to informational 
problems by rationing capital.  
One way to resolve market frictions that impede investment efficiency is to level the 
information playing field between firms and external suppliers of capital. Consistent with 
this idea, several studies find that financial reporting quality is positively associated with 
investment efficiency (e.g., Bens and Monahan 2004; Biddle and Hilary 2006; Bushman 
et al. 2006; McNichols and Stubben 2008; Biddle et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2013). Financial 
reporting quality can reduce information asymmetry—and thereby promote investment 
efficiency—by making firms’ investing activities more transparent, which helps outsiders 
to assess firms’ investment prospects and gives managers a disincentive to invest in projects 
that diverge from shareholder interests.4 Higher reporting quality is also likely to coincide 
with higher analyst coverage and institutional investor ownership (Lang and Lundholm 
1996; Bushee and Noe 2000; De Franco, Kothari, and Verdi 2011), further enriching the 
information environment.   
                                                 
4 Another information-leveling mechanism employed when firms seek investment capital is relationship 
banking, where banks demand various forms of private disclosure as a condition of lending (e.g., Biddle and 
Hilary 2006; Beatty, Liao, and Weber 2010).   
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While financial reporting quality can improve investment efficiency by reducing 
information asymmetry between firms and capital suppliers, prior research also suggests 
that financial reporting can be constrained in its information-leveling abilities. For example, 
the ability of accruals to map into cash flows is constrained by innate volatility in a firm’s 
operating environment (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 
2005) and firms with low innate accruals quality tend to have higher information 
asymmetry (Bhattacharya et al. 2013). Moreover, firms with highly complex financial 
reports tend to issue more voluntary disclosures (Guay et al. 2016; Balakrishnan et al. 
2019), which suggests that financial reporting complexity presents information-leveling 
challenges. Lastly, investors’ perceptions of a firm’s accounting quality decline when 
industry peer firms restate their earnings (Gleason et al. 2008; Kravet and Shevlin 2010), 
which suggests that restatements trigger industry-wide shocks to financial reporting quality 
that place outsiders at an informational disadvantage because of elevated information risk.  
To summarize, while financial reporting quality can ease investment frictions by 
increasing the transparency of firms’ investing activities, information leveling may be 
constrained because of financial reporting limitations that are beyond firms’ immediate 
control. Such limitations, in turn, are likely to impair the ability of information 
intermediaries and monitoring agents to resolve information problems because poor 
transparency increases their information acquisition and processing costs and subjects them 
to higher information risk. In the next section, we discuss how voluntary disclosure quality 
could compensate for information environment deficiencies and facilitate investment 




Voluntary disclosure as an information-leveling mechanism 
Prior studies often predict that voluntary disclosure arises in an effort to reduce 
information asymmetry between firms and capital suppliers (Ajinkya and Gift 1984; 
Verrecchia 1990, 2001). Consistent with this prediction, empirical studies find that 
voluntary disclosure is positively associated with pre-disclosure bid-ask spreads (Coller 
and Yohn 1997) and financial reporting complexity (Guay et al. 2016), while it is 
negatively associated with pre-disclosure financial statement informativeness (Tasker 
1998), analyst coverage (Balakrishnan et al. 2014) and corporate transparency 
(Balakrishnan et al. 2019). Many of these studies also provide evidence that suggests 
voluntary disclosure reduces information asymmetry, as voluntary disclosure appears to 
increase stock liquidity (Balakrishnan et al. 2014), decrease bid-ask spreads (Coller and 
Yohn 1997) and decrease analyst forecast errors (Balakrishnan et al. 2019). Moreover, 
higher voluntary disclosure quality is found to increase investors’ and analysts’ 
responsiveness to disclosure (Williams 1996; Hutton and Stocken 2009; Yang 2012; Ng, 
Tuna, and Verdi 2013; Hilary et al. 2014), which suggests that higher voluntary disclosure 
quality is likely to lead to greater information leveling. Thus, there is broad support in the 
literature for the information-leveling role of voluntary disclosure in the capital markets.  
Given this support, it is natural to ask whether voluntary disclosure plays a similar 
role to financial reporting in facilitating investment efficiency. Compared to financial 
reporting, voluntary disclosure may be less effective at information leveling because 
voluntary disclosures are largely unaudited and thus more difficult to verify. In addition, 
the quality of a firm’s financial reports and voluntary disclosures are likely to be similarly 
influenced by innate factors such as a firm’s operating environment and business model, 
11 
 
which limits voluntary disclosure’s information-leveling abilities when innate quality is 
high (because information asymmetry is already low) and when innate quality is low 
(because disclosure signals are more likely to be less precise). Nonetheless, theory suggests 
that verification difficulties may pose less of a constraint on information leveling when 
capital suppliers can assess the truthfulness of disclosures ex post (Stocken 2000) or when 
disclosures are issued in the presence of current or potential competitors (Gigler 1994). 
Moreover, theory predicts that firms may expend more resources on disclosure than is 
socially optimal to increase price efficiency and investment efficiency (Fishman and 
Hagerty 1989), which suggests that firms are willing to incur excessive costs to overcome 
low innate quality. Consequently, we expect higher voluntary disclosure quality to provide 
greater information leveling, which, in turns, facilitates greater investment efficiency. Thus, 
we form the following baseline hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 1. Voluntary disclosure quality is positively associated with 
investment efficiency. 
While a positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and investment 
efficiency is consistent with disclosure facilitating investment efficiency through 
information leveling, it is also consistent with managerial forecasting abilities facilitating 
investment efficiency through effective capital budgeting (Goodman et al. 2014). Thus, we 
form additional hypotheses to better identify the information-leveling mechanism 
underlying the disclosure quality/investment efficiency association. First, we expect 
voluntary disclosure quality to provide greater information leveling when financial 
reporting and other elements of the information environment are more constrained in their 
information-leveling abilities. In highly constrained environments (e.g., low reporting 
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quality and low analyst coverage), capital suppliers are likely to have greater difficulties in 
identifying and monitoring firms’ investment activities. Because market frictions are likely 
to be high in such environments, voluntary disclosure has a greater opportunity to facilitate 
investment efficiency through information leveling. By contrast, less constrained 
environments should make it easier for capital suppliers to identify and monitor firms’ 
investment activities, so voluntary disclosure quality is less likely to incrementally 
contribute to information leveling. This leads to our next hypothesis:  
HYPOTHESIS 2. The positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and 
investment efficiency strengthens as the information environment becomes more 
constrained. 
Next, we expect the information-leveling role of voluntary disclosure quality to 
increase following negative shocks to financial reporting quality. As discussed earlier, 
Gleason et al. (2008) and Kravet and Shevlin (2010) find that a firm’s perceived accounting 
quality declines when an industry peer firm restates their earnings. This suggests that peer 
firm restatement events provide negative accounting quality shocks that could increase a 
firm’s (real or perceived) information advantage over outsiders. However, if firms maintain 
a track record of high quality voluntary disclosure, then such shocks may be less 
detrimental to the information environment, as voluntary disclosure can serve as a 
substitute for financial reporting as a means of information leveling. Consequently, the 
positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and investment efficiency is 
likely to strengthen in the aftermath of a peer firm restatement event. This leads to our third 
hypothesis: 
HYPOTHESIS 3. The positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and 
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investment efficiency strengthens in the period following an accounting restatement 
by an industry peer firm relative to the immediately preceding period. 
 
3.  Baseline model and sample  
Baseline model  
Equation (1) below is our baseline regression model: 
1
n
0 1 i,t+1i,t+1 i,t j i,t
j
EFF_CAP = + *MFC + *Controls + ε  

  (1) 
The dependent variable, EFF_CAPi,t+1, measures the efficiency of a firm’s capital 
expenditures. To construct EFF_CAPi,t+1, we follow prior studies (e.g., Biddle et al. 2009; 
Goodman et al. 2014; Shroff 2017; Chen, Kim, Wei, and Zhang 2018) and first estimate a 
model of normal capital expenditures by regressing capital expenditures (scaled by assets) 
on lagged Tobin’s Q, cash flows from operations (scaled by assets), lagged asset growth, 
and lagged capital expenditures (scaled by assets) using firms in the same industry and 
year.5 Next, we measure abnormal capital expenditures for each firm-year as the absolute 
value of the residual from its corresponding normal capital expenditure model, multipled 
by 100. Last, because the efficiency of capital expenditures is decreasing in abnormal 
capital expenditures, we define EFF_CAPi,t+1 as the negative of abnormal capital 
expenditures. Thus, we interpret increasing values of EFF_CAPi,t+1 as indicating increasing 
investment efficiency.      
Our main test variable, MFCi,t, is an indicator variable that measures management 
                                                 
5 Throughout the paper, we define industries following Fama and French (1997). For each industry-year 
regression, we require a minimum of 30 observations.  
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forecast consistency, which is our proxy for voluntary disclosure quality. We set MFCi,t 
equal to one if the standard deviation of management EPS forecast errors is less than the 
standard deviation of consensus analyst EPS forecast errors over the most recent five years 
(year t-4 to year t); if not, we set MFCi,t equal to zero. We define management forecast 
errors (analyst consensus forecast errors) as the difference between realized annual EPS 
and the management annual EPS forecast (analyst consensus annual EPS forecast), scaled 
by stock price as of three days prior to the management forecast date (analyst consensus 
forecast date). We interpret firms for which MFCi,t = 1 as having higher management 
forecast consistency, and therefore higher voluntary disclosure quality, than firms for which 
MFCi,t = 0. According to Hilary et al. (2014), management forcast consistency aligns with 
the Bayesian notion of information quality because, as a second moment measure, it 
captures the precision of information signals provided by management forecasts. In 
theoretical disclosure models, precision is widely used as a defining attribute of 
information quality (Verrecchia 2001) and empirical studies often use precision to 
conceptualize and operationalize financial reporting and disclosure quality (Biddle et al. 
2009; Ng 2011; Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Roychowdhury et al. 2019). Although highly 
consistent forecasts can also be highly inaccurate, Rogers and Stocken (2005) find that 
investors can detect and filter out management forecast biases, which suggests that 
inaccurate forecasts can still be informative. Consistent with this, Hilary et al. (2014) 
estimate that analyst and investor responsiveness to consistent forecasts is two to five times 
greater than their responsiveness to accurate forecasts. Moreover, Hilary et al. (2014) find 
that consistency effects often subsume accuracy effects, so in the interest of increasing test 
power, we operationalize voluntary disclosure quality using forecast consistency rather 
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than forecast accuracy. 
With our dependent variable and main test variable defined, we turn to specifying 
our baseline model prediction (i.e., our test of Hypothesis 1). Recall that Hypothesis 1 
predicts a positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and investment 
efficiency. Thus, if Hypothesis 1 holds in our sample, then we expect 𝛽1 to be positive.  
Equation (1) includes a battery of control variables that prior studies show to be 
correlated with investment efficiency. Because several studies correlate financial reporting 
quality with investment efficiency (e.g., Biddle et al. 2009; Cheng et al. 2013), we include 
several financial reporting quality controls, including accruals quality, internal control 
weaknesses, earnings volatility, and earnings persistence. We also control for various 
management forecast attributes, including management forecast accuracy, which Goodman 
et al. (2014) find to be positively associated with investment efficiency, consistent with 
managers’ forecasting skills indicating the quality of their investment decisions. In addition, 
because prior studies link weak corporate governance to investment inefficiencies (e.g., 
Jensen 1986; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick 2003), we 
control for the quality of corporate governance by including the Entrenchment index 
developed in Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell (2009) and the percentage of shares owned by 
institutional investors. For the full set of control variables with detailed definitions, please 
refer to the Appendix.  
[Insert Table 1] 
Sample  
We collect data from the intersection of the IBES Guidance, CRSP, and Compustat 
databases over a sample period spanning 1998 to 2017. To calculate MFC, which is our 
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main test variable, we require each firm to issue at least four annual EPS forecasts over the 
most recent five years on a rolling basis and that the firm’s CEO does not change over this 
period. When calculating MFC, forecasts must be non-duplicate, point or range forecasts 
issued prior to their corresponding earnings announcement date. We also require, for each 
management forecast, data for the corresponding analyst consensus forecast (comprised of 
forecasts from at least two analysts), actual EPS realization, and stock price as of three 
days prior to the issuance of the management forecast. The above procedures yield an initial 
sample of 10,268 firm-year observations. Next, we remove financial service firms (SIC 
codes 6000–6999) and utility firms (SIC codes 4910-4939). After that, we remove firm-
years with outlier characteristics that could present potential model estimation problems. 
Last, we remove firm-years that are missing data needed to estimate our baseline model. 
Our final baseline sample consists of 6,248 firm-year observations. Table 1 summarizes 
our sample selection procedures.  
[Insert Table 2] 
4.  Main results 
Baseline model descriptive statistics and regression results (Hypothesis 1) 
Table 2, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics for the variables in equation (1).6 
The mean of our dependent variable, EFF_CAP is -1.32. The mean of our main test 
variable, MFC,  is 0.65, which indicates that management forecasts exhibit higher 
consistency (i.e., lower forecast error volatility) than analyst forecasts about 65 percent of 
the time. The average firm has logged assets (SIZE) of $7.67 million, a return-on-assets 
                                                 
6 Throughout the paper, continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 percent and 99 percent levels. 
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ratio (AVG_ROA) of 6.8 percent, a book-to-market ratio (BTM) of 44.0 percent, and 
financial leverage (LEV) of 51.1 percent. Statistics for analyst and management forecast 
characteristic variables are similar to those reported in prior studies.  
Table 2, Panel B, compares variable means and medians of “consistent” firms (MFC 
= 1) with variable means and medians of “inconsistent” firms (MFC = 0). Consistent firms 
tend to have higher values of EFF_CAP than inconsistent firms, which suggests that 
consistent firms tend to invest more efficiently in capital expenditures than inconsistent 
firms. This provides some preliminary support for Hypothesis 1. The mean of management 
forecast accuracy (MFA) for consistent firms is 0.61, which indicates that management 
forecasts of consistent firms exhibit greater accuracy than analyst forecasts (when averaged 
over years t-4 to t) roughly 60 percent of the time. Meanwhile, for inconsistent firms, 
management forecast accuracy is greater than analyst forecast accuracy 46 percent of the 
time (mean MFA = 0.456). Thus, while consistency does not always ensure accuracy, 
consistent firms tend to have higher forecast accuracy than inconsistent firms. The 
remaining variables are similar between consistent and inconsistent firms along all 
dimensions except for management forecast horizon (MFH is shorter for consistent firms), 
leverage (LEV is lower for consistent firms), operating cash flow volatility (STD_CFO is 
lower for consistent firms), analyst coverage (ANACOV is lower for consistent firms), and 
institutional ownership (IO is higher for consistent firms).  
Table 2, Panel C, provides a correlation matrix. We observe a significantly positive 
correlation between management forecast consistency (MFC) and investment efficiency 
(EFF_CAP), providing more preliminary support for Hypothesis 1. Note as well that the 
correlation between MFC and MFA is only 0.15, which suggests that consistency and 
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accuracy, while related, convey different aspects of management forecast quality.  
[Insert Table 3] 
Table 3 presents results from estimating three different specifications of equation 
(1).7 Columns 1 and 2 present results of regressions that exclude control variables. In 
Column 1, the coefficient on MFC is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (coeff 
= 0.136, t = 2.85). In Column 2, which presents results with industry-year fixed effects, the 
coefficient on MFC is positive and significant at the 5 percent level (coeff = 0.097, t = 
2.27). In Column 3, we present results for the full baseline model with control variables 
and industry-year fixed effects. After adding control variables, we once again observe a 
positive and significant coefficient at the 1 percent level on MFC (coeff = 0.102, t = 2.58). 
To provide an economic sense of these effects, when abnormal capital expenditures are at 
the sample mean [1.32 (the negative of the mean of EFF_CAP in Table 2, Panel A)], going 
from an inconsistent (MFC = 0) to a consistent (MFC = 1) management forecast track 
record is expected to reduce abnormal capital expenditures by 7.8 percent [0.102 (the 
coefficient on MFC in Table 3, Column 3) divided by 1.32 (the mean of abnormal capital 
expenditures), with rounding]. 
Overall, the results in Table 3 support Hypothesis 1 in that they suggest firms with 
higher voluntary disclosure quality invest more efficiently in capital expenditures than 
firms with lower voluntary disclosure quality. While these results are consistent with 
voluntary disclosure quality facilitating investment efficiency through information leveling, 
they are also consistent with managers with superior forecasting abilities making superior 
investment decisions (Goodman et al. 2014). Although equation 1 controls for management 
                                                 
7 Throughout the paper, we cluster standard errors at the firm level. 
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forecast accuracy (MFA, the proxy for forecasting ability in Goodman et al. 2014), it is 
premature to conclude that voluntary disclosure quality facilitates investment efficiency 
through the information-leveling channel, but, at a minimum, Table 3 confirms that the 
predicted baseline association between voluntary disclosure quality and investment 
efficiency arises in our sample.  
 
Information environment attributes (Hypothesis 2) 
Recall that Hypothesis 2 predicts that the positive association between voluntary 
disclosure quality and investment efficiency strengthens as the information environment 
becomes more constrained. We test this hypothesis using an expanded version of our 
baseline model that employs a variety of cross-sectional information environment 
attributes to proxy for the extent to which a firm’s information environment is constrained. 




0 1 2 i,t+1i,t+1 i,t i,t i,t j i,t
j
EFF_CAP = + *MFC  + *MFC InfoEnvAttr + *Controls + ε   

  (2) 
InfoEnvAttr captures an attribute of the information environment, and all other variables 
are defined as before. We use the following attributes to measure InfoEnvAttr: accruals 
quality (AQ), defined as the negative of the standard deviation of abnormal accruals over 
the most recent five years (estimated with the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model 
using the specification suggested by McNichols (2002)), earnings volatility (STD_ROA), 
defined as the standard deviation of return on assets over the most recent five years, cash 
flow volatility (STD_CFO), defined as the standard deviation of operating cash flows 
(scaled by total assets) over the most recent five years, business segments (BS), defined as 
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the natural logarithm of the number of reported business segments in year t,8 firm size 
(SIZE), defined as the natural logarithm of lagged total assets at the end of year t, and 
analyst coverage (ANACOV), defined as the number of analysts issuing EPS forecasts for 
the firm in year t. We estimate equation (2) separately for each attribute and 𝛽2 measures 
the effect of the attribute on the relation between investment efficiency and management 
forecast consistency. For some attribute variables, the information environment becomes 
more constrained as the variable increases (STD_ROA, STD_CFO, BS), and in such cases, 
we expect 𝛽2 to be positive, as more constrained environments should strengthen the 
positive relation between investment efficiency and management forecast consistency. For 
other attribute variables, the information environment becomes more constrained as the 
variable decreases (AQ, SIZE, ANACOV), so in these cases, we expect 𝛽2 to be negative.  
[Insert Table 4] 
Table 4 presents the results of estimations of equation (2) using the six information 
environment attributes discussed above. In Panel A, where the attribute is accruals quality 
(AQ), the coefficient on MFC*AQ is negative and significant at the 10% level (t = -1.93). 
This result is consistent with Hypothesis 2, as it suggests that the positive relation between 
investment efficiency and management forecast consistency strengthens as accruals quality 
declines. In Panels B and C, where the attributes are, respectively, earnings volatility 
(STD_ROA) and cash flow volatility (STD_CFO), the interaction coefficients are both 
positive, with the coefficient on MFC*STD_ROA significant at the 10% level (t = 1.68) 
and the coefficient on MFC*STD_CFO significant at the 1% level (t = 2.80). These results 
are again consistent with Hypothesis 2, as they suggest that greater volatility in earnings 
                                                 
8 Several studies use the number of business segments as a proxy for firm complexity, including Nagar, 
Nanda, and Wysocki (2003), Francis, Nanda, and Olsson (2008) and Chen, Miao, and Shevlin (2015). 
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and cash flows strengthens the positive relation between investment efficiency and 
management forecast consistency. In Panel D, where the attribute is the number of business 
segments (BS), the coefficient on MFC*BS is positive but insignificant, which does not 
support Hypothesis 2.9 In Panels E and F, where the attributes are, respectively, firm size 
(SIZE) and analyst coverage (ANACOV), the interaction coefficients are both negative, with 
the coefficient on MFC*SIZE significant at the 1% level (t = -3.10) and the coefficient on 
MFC*ANACOV significant at the 5% level (t = -2.37). These results are consistent with 
Hypothesis 2, as they suggest that the positive relation between investment efficiency and 
management forecast consistency strengthens when firms are smaller and covered by fewer 
analysts.  
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that voluntary disclosure quality is 
more strongly associated with investment efficiency when the information environment is 
more constrained, consistent with voluntary disclosure linking to investment efficiency 
through the information-leveling channel. Nevertheless, a possible limitation of this 
analysis is that the potential for information leveling is measured based on cross-sectional 
attributes of the information environment, rather than the extent of information asymmetry. 
In the next section, we employ a setting where the potential for information leveling is 
identified based on a negative shock to a firm’s public (but not private) information quality.  
 
                                                 
9 While operating complexity is likely to be higher when firms have more segments, the quality of financial 
reporting may also be higher, which would weaken voluntary disclosure quality’s information-leveling role 
in complex environments. For example, Berger and Hann (2003) find that SFAS 131, which resulted in an 
increase in the number of reported segments, improved the information and monitoring environment, while 
Berger and Hann (2007) find that decisions to report fewer segments relate to unresolved agency costs at a 
firm.    
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Peer firm restatement events (Hypothesis 3)  
Recall that Hypothesis 3 predicts that the positive association between voluntary 
disclosure quality and investment efficiency strengthens in the period following an 
accounting restatement by an industry peer firm relative to the immediately preceding 
period. To test this hypothesis, we select a test sample from our baseline sample using the 
following procedures. First, we identify all restatement events over our sample period using 
the Audit Analytics database and we classify firms in year t as having a peer firm 
restatement event if at least one of its industry peers restates its financial statements in year 
t.10 Next, for all firms that have peer firm restatement events in year t, we retain year t+1 
and year t+2 as “treatment” years and year t-1 and year t as “control” years. In cases where 
an industry peer restates multiple times over our sample period, we retain only observations 
related to the first restatement event, and if one of these observations overlaps with a 
subsequent event observation, we remove it from the sample. Last, we remove firms that 
restated their own financial statements during the treatment or control years to ensure our 
sample consists of non-restating firms. These steps leave us with a final test sample of 
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  (3) 
PEER_RS is an indicator variable that equals one for “treatment” firm-years, and 
zero for “control” firm-years. All other variables are defined as before. 𝛽2 measures the 
effect of a peer firm restatement event on the relation between investment efficiency and 
                                                 
10  We use restatements of annual reporting where the restatement period is at least one year and the 
restatement corrects “fraudulent” reporting (i.e., RES_FRAUD = 1 in Audit Analytics’ Non-Reliance 
Restatements database).     
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management forecast consistency. If, consistent with Hypothesis 3, peer firm restatement 
events strengthen that relation, then we expect 𝛽2 to be positive. Notice that we use the 
firm as its own control when testing Hypothesis 3, as all firms appear in equation (3) with 
treatment (PEER_RS = 1) and control (PEER_RS = 0) observations. By using the firm as 
its own control, this test helps alleviate endogeneity concerns from potential specification 
errors in our baseline model.11     
[Insert Table 5] 
Table 5 presents the results of our estimation of equation (3). The coefficient on 
MFC*PEER_RS is positive and significant at the 1 percent level (t = 2.66), which suggests 
that the relation between investment efficiency and management forecast consistency is 
significantly more positive in the treatment period relative to the control period. This result 
supports Hypothesis 3, as it suggests that voluntary disclosure quality’s association with 
investment efficiency strengthens following a peer firm restatement event.12 Because peer 
firm restatement events are likely to decrease the (real or perceived) quality of a firm’s 
financial reporting, such a strengthening aligns with the idea that voluntary disclosure can 
substitute for financial reporting as an information-leveling mechanism that facilitates 
investment efficiency. 
 
                                                 
11  In section 5, we further address potential endogeneity concerns by examining a changes-based 
specification of our baseline model. 
12 When we estimate the baseline model (i.e., equation 1) with the peer firm restatement sample, we find that 
the coefficient on MFC is significantly positive (untabulated). Thus, we also find support for Hypothesis 1 
using our peer firm restatement sample.  
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5.  Additional analyses and robustness tests 
Firms prone to investment distortions in constrained information environments 
When firms operate in constrained information environments, the potential for 
investment distortions is likely to vary with firm-level attributes such as financial resource 
availability, growth opportunities, and corporate governance quality. Thus, if voluntary 
disclosure quality facilitates investment efficiency through information leveling, then 
disclosure quality should bestow greater efficiency benefits for firms that are more prone 
to investment distortions in constrained information environments. To explore this 
conjecture, we identify a series of firm-level attributes that are likely to indicate a higher 
propensity for investment distortions in constrained information environments and we test 
whether the positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and investment 
efficiency strengthens with these attributes. Whether we observe stronger associations in 
certain settings may depend on the particular market friction (adverse selection or moral 
hazard) contributing to investment distortions. For example, we may not see stronger 
associations in settings prone to moral hazard frictions because voluntary disclosures are 
not used in contracts for monitoring purposes, or because voluntary disclosure quality is 
achieved through myopic behaviors that ensure reported earnings meet targets set by 
managers. While we do not form hypotheses regarding voluntary disclosure quality’s 
ability to mitigate specific market frictions, we derive inferences from our collective 
findings about which frictions are likely to decrease with higher voluntary disclosure 
quality in a discussion section that follows our empirical analyses.13  
                                                 
13 In their review of the effects of financial reporting and disclosure on corporate investment, Roychowdhury 
et al. (2019) note that it is difficult to distinguish adverse selection mitigation from moral hazard mitigation 
in empirical settings and that financial reporting’s effect on investment efficiency is often consistent with 
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Financial resource availability  
Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013) argue that financially constrained 
(unconstrained) firms are more prone to under-invest (over-invest) because of market 
frictions that arise with information asymmetry. For example, financially constrained firms 
may under-invest because investors ration capital in response to high information risk, 
while financially unconstrained firms may over-invest because managers have incentives 
to empire build when it is difficult to monitor their activities. Consistent with financial 
reporting quality mitigating these types of distortions, Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. 
(2013) show that financially constrained (unconstrained) firms under-invest (over-invest) 
less when their financial reporting quality is higher. These findings also imply that a given 
increase in financial reporting quality is likely to improve investment efficiency more for 
firms with either scarce or abundant financial resources than for firms with modest 
financial resources. 14  Therefore, if voluntary disclosure quality similarly facilitates 
investment efficiency through the information-leveling channel, then the efficiency 
benefits of voluntary disclosure quality should be greater for financially constrained and 
unconstrained firms relative to firms with modest financial resources. To test this 
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financial reporting mitigating both frictions. 
14 Relative to firms with scarce resources, firms with modest resources are less likely to under-invest because 
they can more readily substitute internal funds for external funds to pursue good investments. Relative to 
firms with abundant resources, firms with modest resources are less likely to over-invest because lower 
resource availability restricts their flexibility to pursue bad investments.   
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Following Biddle et al. (2009) and Cheng et al. (2013), we estimate financial resource 
availability based on a firm’s cash balance and financial leverage. Specifically, we measure 
financial resource availability as the average rank of a ranked (deciles) measure of cash 
and negative leverage (we rank negative leverage so that liquidity is increasing in ranks, as 
it is with cash). We then define FinanciallyConstrained (FinanciallyUnconstrained) as an 
indicator variable equal to one if the ranked financial resource availability measure is in 
the bottom (top) tercile for year t, and zero otherwise. 𝛽2 (𝛽3) measures the incremental 
relation between investment efficiency and management forecast consistency for 
financially constrained (unconstrained) firms. If the positive association between voluntary 
disclosure quality and investment efficiency strengthens for financially constrained 
(unconstrained) firms, then we expect 𝛽2 (𝛽3) to be positive.  
[Insert Table 6] 
Table 6 presents the results of our estimation of equation (4). The coefficient on 
MFC*FinanciallyConstrained is positive and significant at the 10% level (t = 1.81), which 
suggests that the positive association between investment efficiency and management 
forecast consistency strengthens when firms are financially constrained. Meanwhile, the 
coefficient on MFC*FinanciallyUnconstrained is negative and insignificant. Thus, the 
results in Table 6 are consistent with voluntary disclosure quality facilitating incrementally 
higher investment efficiency for financially constrained firms, but not for financially 
unconstrained firms.  
Growth opportunities 
Prior literature suggests that young and growing firms have higher disclosure 
propensities because of deficiencies in their financial reporting (e.g., Tasker 1998; Frankel, 
27 
 
Johnson, and Skinner 1999; Core 2001). Because GAAP financial reports convey historical 
numbers with a conservative bias, young and growing firms often have a hard time 
conveying their growth prospects to outside capital suppliers through mandatory reporting. 
While such deficiencies make young and growing firms naturally prone to market frictions, 
investment distortions may be especially pronounced for these firms (in the absence of 
disclosure) because they are likely to rely heavily on external capital to keep up with their 
growth opportunities. Thus, voluntary disclosure quality may be especially influential in 
facilitating investment efficiency for young and growing firms, which prompts us to 




0 1 2 i,t+1i,t+1 i,t i,t i,t j i,t
j
EFF_CAP = + *MFC  + *MFC GrowthOp + *Controls + ε   

  (5) 
GrowthOp captures variation in a firm’s growth opportunities, which we measure using the 
following variables: firm age (AGE), defined as year t minus the year that the firm first 
appears in the CRSP database, firm life cycle stage (LIFECYCLE), which equals 1 for 
“introduction” stage firms, 2 for “growth” stage firms, 3 for “mature” stage firms, 4 for 
“shake-out” stage firms and 5 for “decline” stage firms based on the cash flow statement 
methodology used in Dickinson (2011), dividend payout ratio (PAYOUT_RATIO), defined 
as cash dividends per share divided by primary earnings per share before extraordinary 
items, and sales growth (SALES_GROWTH), defined as the change in sales over year t 
divided by lagged total assets. If the positive association between voluntary disclosure 
quality and investment efficiency strengthens for young and growing firms, then we expect 
𝛽2 to be positive when GrowthOp is SALES_GROWTH and negative when GrowthOp is 
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AGE, LIFECYCLE, and PAYOUT_RATIO.15  
 [Insert Table 7] 
Table 7 presents the results of our estimations of equation (5) using the four growth 
opportunity proxy variables discussed above. We find that MFC*AGE (Panel A) and 
MFC*PAYOUT_RATIO (Panel C) are both significantly negative at the 5% level (t = -2.13 
in Panel A and t = -2.32 in Panel C). In addition, we find that MFC*LIFECYCLE (Panel B) 
is significantly negative, and MFC*SALES_GROWTH (Panel D) is significantly positive, 
both at the 10% level (t = -1.74 in Panel B and t = 1.87 in Panel D). All of these results are 
consistent with the idea that voluntary disclosure quality’s information-leveling link to 
investment efficiency strengthens for firms that are likely to have higher growth prospects.   
 
Corporate governance  
Prior research finds that investment efficiency declines in settings of weak corporate 
governance (e.g., Jensen 1986; Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003; Gompers et al. 2003). 
Such a relation arises because managers are less inclined to act in shareholders’ best 
interests when governance is weaker, which can lead to over-investment when managers 
have incentives to empire build (Jensen 1986) or under-investment when managers have 
incentives to lead a quiet life (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2003). However, prior research 
also finds that financial reporting quality can compensate for weaknesses in various 
corporate governance structures by facilitating better monitoring of managers’ activities 
(e.g., Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith 2004; Francis and Martin 2010; Armstrong, 
                                                 
15 Gul (1999) shows that dividend payout ratios are negatively related to firms’ investment opportunities. 




Balakrishnan, and Cohen 2012). Thus, if voluntary disclosure quality can similarly 
compensate for weak governance, then voluntary disclosure quality’s ability to facilitate 
investment efficiency may strengthen as the quality of corporate governance declines. We 
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WeakGov captures the weakness of a firm’s corporate governance, which we measure using 
the following variables: the Governance Index developed by Gompers et al. (2003) 
(GINDEX), defined as the number of shareholder rights-decreasing provisions (ranging 
from 0 to 24) listed in the database compiled by the Investor Responsibility Resource 
Center (IRRC), the Entrenchment Index developed by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) 
(EINDEX), defined as the number of entrenchment items listed in the database compiled 
by the IRRC, and a corporate governance measure developed by Gillan, Hartzell, and Stark 
(2011) (CGPCA), defined as the first principal component derived from an analysis (using 
data from BoardEx) of: board size, CEO duality, the presence of a lead independent director, 
the presence of a governance committee, and the percentage of independent directors 
sitting on the board. As each of these variables increases, corporate goverance is expected 
to become weaker. Thus, if weaker governance strengthens voluntary disclosure quality’s 
information-leveling role in facilitating investment efficiency, then we expect 𝛽2 to be 
positive. 
 [Insert Table 8] 
Table 8 presents the results of our estimations of equation (6) using the three 
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corporate governance proxy variables discussed above.16 In all three panels, the coefficient 
on MFC*WeakGov (WeakGov = GINDEX in Panel A, EINDEX in Panel B, and CGPCA in 
Panel C) is never significantly positive. Therefore, our results are inconsistent with weaker 
corporate governance strengthening voluntary disclosure quality’s information-leveling 
role in facilitating investment efficiency. 
Discussion 
The results in Tables 6 and 7 suggest that the positive association between voluntary 
disclosure quality and investment efficiency strengthens when firms are young, growing, 
and financially constrained. Firms that are young, growing, and financially constrained are 
likely to have higher demand for external capital to pursue good investment opportunities. 
Thus, observing a stronger association between voluntary disclosure quality and 
investment efficiency for these firms aligns with the idea that disclosure quality improves 
the allocation of external capital to good investment opportunities by improving capital 
suppliers’ ability to identify them. Our evidence therefore suggests that voluntary 
disclosure quality mitigates adverse selection frictions that impede investment efficiency.  
Meanwhile, in Tables 6 and 8, we do not find evidence that the positive association 
between voluntary disclosure quality and investment efficiency strengthens for firms that 
are weakly governed or financially unconstrained. Such firms are likely to have higher 
propensities to suboptimally invest, either because there are fewer disincentives for such 
behavior or because the means to pursue suboptimal investments are greater. Thus, our 
findings do not support the idea that voluntary disclosure quality facilitates investment 
efficiency by improving outsiders’ abilities to monitor managers with incentives and 
                                                 
16 Because of missing data, we lose 494 observations when estimating equation (6) with CGPCA. 
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abilities to pursue bad investment opportunities. Consequently, we fail to find evidence 
consistent with voluntary disclosure quality mitigating moral hazard frictions that impede 
investment efficiency. While we argue that voluntary disclosure quality has information-
leveling abilities, such abilities may be insufficient to resolve moral hazard issues if 
voluntarily disclosed numbers cannot be used in contractual settings for monitoring 
purposes. Alternatively, firms with moral hazard issues may be inherently less likely to 
provide high quality disclosures, as doing so would increase the likelihood that managers’ 
self-serving behavior would be detected. We leave a further exploration of these issues for 
future research.     
 
Robustness tests  
 
Changes-based specification of the baseline model 
As noted earlier, a positive association between voluntary disclosure quality and 
investment efficiency is consistent not only with voluntary disclosure facilitating 
investment efficiency through information leveling, but also with managerial forecasting 
abilities facilitating investment efficiency through effective capital budgeting (Goodman 
et al. 2014). While our baseline model includes control variables that are likely to capture 
managers’ forecasting abilities (e.g., MFA, ICW17), and our empirical tests attempt to 
identify cross-sectional variation consistent with information leveling, we cannot 
completely rule out the influence of forecasting abilities on our earlier results. Nevertheless, 
a changes-based specification of our baseline model allows us to minimize the influence 
                                                 
17 Goodman et al. (2014) note that weak information systems are likely to reflect weak managerial abilities 
because managers help to design and implement information systems to facilitate their decision making. Thus, 
internal control weaknesses may capture weak forecasting abilities in addition to poor financial reporting 
quality.    
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of managers’ inherent forecasting abilities on the relation between voluntary disclosure 
quality and investment efficiency. To the extent that managers’ forecasting abilities are 
fixed traits, they would exert little influence on changes in voluntary disclosure quality, so 
a positive changes-based association is unlikely to reflect better capital budgeting decisions 




0 1 i,t+1i,t+1 i,t j i,t
j
CHG_EFF_CAP = + *CHG_MFC  + *CHG_Controls + ε  

  (7) 
CHG_EFF_CAPi,t+1 is the first difference of EFF_CAPi,t+1 (i.e., EFF_CAPi,t+1 - 
EFF_CAPi,t), CHG_MFCi,t is the first difference of MFCi,t (i.e., MFCi,t - MFCi,t-1), and 
CHG_Controlsi,t represents first differences of all control variables from the baseline model. 
If increases in management forecast consistency are associated with increases in 
investment efficiency, then we expect 𝛽1 to be positive.  
 [Insert Table 9] 
Table 9 presents the results of our estimation of equation (7).18 The coefficient on 
CHG_MFC is positive and significant at the 5% level (t = 2.19), which suggests that 
increases in management forecast consistency are associated with increases in investment 
efficiency. Thus, to the extent that managers’ forecasting abilities are fixed over 
consecutive years, the results in Table 9 suggest that the positive association between 
voluntary disclosure quality and investment efficiency is unlikely to be solely driven by 
these abilities.   
                                                 
18 Because a changes-based specification requires an additional year of data relative to a levels-based 
specification, we lose 1,370 baseline model observations when estimating equation (7). 
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Explicit control for managerial ability 
Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012) develop a measure of managerial ability (MA-
Score) from financial statement variables and subsequent studies find that the MA-Score 
predicts a wide range of capital market outcomes, including CEO turnover, earnings quality, 
and tax avoidance (Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay 2013; Koester, Shevlin, and 
Wangerin 2016). Thus, to provide further control for managerial ability in our tests, we 
repeat the analyses in Tables 3 through 9 after including MA-Score as an additional 
explanatory variable. In untabulated analyses, we find that our results remain significant in 
all cases except for Table 7, Panel B, where the coefficient on MFC*LIFECYCLE is no 
longer signficiant using a two-tailed test (p-value = 0.12). Overall, these findings provide 
further support for our position that voluntary disclosure quality’s empirical link to 
investment efficiency is unlikely to be solely attributable to managers’ inherent forecasting 
abilities.   
Selection bias 
Because the decision to issue management earnings forecasts is an endogenous 
choice, it is possible that our earlier coefficient estimates are biased. To address this 
concern, we follow Goodman et al. (2014) and implement the Heckman two-stage 
procedure to adjust for potential self-selection bias. In stage one, we estimate the likelihood 
of issuing management forecasts, using a sample that includes both forecast and non-
forecast firms. Specifically, we estimate a Probit regression where the dependent variable 
is an indicator of forecast provision (Forecast) and the independent variables are a set of 
documented determinants of forecast provision (e.g., Lennox and Park 2006; Bamber, 
Jiang, and Wang 2010; Goodman et al. 2014). These determinants include firm size, growth 
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opportunities, leverage, earnings volatility, earnings performance, analyst following, the 
percentage of shares held by institutional investors, R&D intensity, and a pair of indicator 
variables identifying firms reporting losses and restructuring charges. In stage two, we 
repeat our earlier regressions (Tables 3 through 9) with the inverse Mills ratio (Mills) 
derived from the Probit regression as an additional regressor. In untabulated analyses, we 
find that our inferences are unaffected by the inclusion of Mills in our regressions.  
Other robustness tests 
In addition to the above tests, we performed the following robustness tests (all 
untabulated). First, we repeated our earlier tests with standard errors clustered by firm and 
by year, following the two-way clustering procedure in Petersen (2009). All of our results 
are robust to two-way clustering. Second, we repeated our earlier tests after truncating our 
sample at the 1 percent and 99 percent level (rather than winsorizing at these levels). We 
find that the tenor of our results holds with truncation, but the following coefficients lose 
significance: MFC*STD_ROA (Table 4, Panel B), MFC*FinanciallyConstrained (Table 6), 
and MFC*LIFECYCLE (Table 7, Panel B). Last, recall that when calculating EFF_CAP, 
we first estimate “normal” capital expenditures using industry-year regressions with a 
minimum of 30 observations. We repeated our tests after lowering the minimum number 
of observations to 25 and 20, respectively, and we find that our results hold in both cases.  
 
6.  Conclusion 
This study examines whether voluntary disclosure quality facilitates investment 
efficiency by playing an information-leveling role that mitigates market frictions that 
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impede efficiency. Our results are consistent with voluntary disclosure quality playing such 
a role. In particular, after documenting a baseline relation between voluntary disclosure 
quality and investment efficiency, we find that this relation strengthens when cross 
sectional attributes indicate weaker information environments and when there are negative 
shocks to financial reporting quality. We also find that the relation strengthens when firms 
are financially constrained, young, and growing, but not when firms are financially 
unconstrained and weakly governed. Thus, our evidence is more consistent with voluntary 
disclosure quality mitigating adverse selection (rather than moral hazard) frictions that 
impede investment efficiency. We also find that changes in voluntary disclosure quality are 
associated with changes in investment efficiency, which suggests that the empirical link 
between voluntary disclosure quality and investment efficiency is not purely driven by 
managers’ inherent forecasting abilities.  
Our findings contribute to our understanding of the determinants of investment 
efficiency by showing that voluntary disclosure quality facilitates investment efficiency in 
a similar manner to how financial reporting quality facilitates efficiency (i.e., through 
information leveling). Voluntary disclosure quality’s information-leveling role is 
particularly important when firms operate in constrained information environments, as 
such environments can inhibit investment efficiency because of difficulties in identifying 
and monitoring firms’ investment acitivities. Our findings also contribute to our 
understanding of the benefits of establishing a track record for high quality voluntary 
disclosure by showing that these benefits extend to real operational outcomes (i.e., greater 
investment efficiency). Further exploration of management forecasting track records and 
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Appendix: Baseline Model Variable Definitions 
Dependent Variable 
EFF_CAPi,t+1  Capital investment efficiency, defined as -100 multiplied by the 
absolute value of a firm-year’s residual from an industry-year 
regression of capital expenditures (scaled by assets) on lagged 
Tobin’s Q, cash flow from operations (scaled by total assets), 
lagged asset growth, and lagged capital expenditures (scaled by 
assets). We define industries following Fama and French (1997) 
and we require a minimum of 30 observations per industry-year 
regression. We interpret larger values of EFF_CAPi,t+1 as 
capturing greater investment efficiency. 
Main Test Variable 
MFCi,t  Management forecast consistency (our proxy for voluntary 
disclosure quality), defined as an indicator variable that equals 
one if the standard deviation of management earnings per share 
(EPS) forecast errors is less than the standard deviation of the 
consensus analyst EPS forecast errors over the past five years (t-
4 to t), and zero otherwise. Management forecast errors (analyst 
consensus forecast errors) are defined as the difference between 
realized EPS and the management EPS forecast (analyst 
consensus EPS forecast), scaled by stock price three days prior 
to the date of the management forecast (analyst consensus 
forecast). All forecasts are for annual EPS. We interpret firms 
with MFCi,t = 1 as having higher management forecast 
consistency (higher voluntary disclosure quality) than firms 
with MFCi,t = 0. 
   
Control Variables  
MFAi,t  Management forecast accuracy, defined as an indicator variable 
that equals one if absolute management forecast errors are 
smaller than absolute consensus analyst forecast errors over 
50% of the time during the past five years (t-4 to t), and zero 
otherwise. All forecasts are for annual EPS. 
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MFHi,t  Management forecast horizon, defined as the natural logarithm 
of one plus the average management forecast horizon over the 
past five years (t-4 to t). Forecast horizon is measured as the 
number of days between the forecast issuance date and the 
fiscal-year end date. All forecasts are for annual EPS. 
MFPi,t  Management forecast precision, defined as the average precision 
of all management EPS forecasts issued over the past five years 
(t-4 to t). For range forecasts, we measure precision as the 
absolute value of the difference between the upper bound and 
the lower bound of the forecast range, scaled by stock price as 
of three days prior to the management forecast date. For point 
forecasts, precision equals zero. We multiply precision by 
negative one so that increasing values capture higher precision. 
All forecasts are for annual EPS. 
SIZEi,t  Firm size, defined as the natural logarithm of lagged total assets 
at the end of fiscal year t. 
AVG_ROAi,t  Average return on assets (ROA) in year t. ROA is defined as 
income before extraordinary items divided by total assets. 
BTMi,t  Book-to-market ratio, defined as the book value of equity 
divided by the market value of equity at the end of year t. 
LEVi,t  Leverage, defined as average total liabilities divided by average 
total assets in year t. 
RETi,t  Past stock returns, defined as the buy-and-hold monthly stock 
return over fiscal year t.  
STD_ROAi,t  Earnings volatility, defined as the standard deviation of return 
on assets over the past five years (t-4 to t). Return on assets is 
measured as income before extraordinary items divided by 
lagged total assets. 
STD_INVi,t  Investment volatility, defined as the standard deviation of the 
ratio of capital expenditures to lagged total assets over the past 
five years (t-4 to t). 
STD_RETi,t  Stock return volatility, defined as the standard deviation of 
monthly stock returns over fiscal year t. 
STD_CFOi,t  Operating cash flow volatility, defined as the standard deviation 
of operating cash flows (scaled by total assets) over the past five 
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years (t-4 to t).  
EPi,t  Earnings persistence, defined as the first-order autocorrelation 
(i.e., AR (1)) in quarterly EPS over the past three years (t-2 to t). 
ICWi,t  Internal control weakness, defined as an indicator variable equal 
to one if there is a material weakness disclosure in Section 404 
of the audit report in year t, and zero otherwise. 
AQi,t  Accruals quality, defined as -1 multiplied by the standard 
deviation of abnormal accruals over the past five years, 
estimated with the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model 
using the specification suggested by McNichols (2002). 
ANACOVi,t  Analyst coverage, defined as the number of analysts issuing EPS 
forecasts for the firm in year t. 
EINDEXi,t  The Entrenchment index (E-index), as developed in Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). The E-index increases by one for 
each of the following corporate governance features: a staggered 
board, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments, poison 
pill/shareholder rights plan, golden parachute, and a 
supermajority requirement for mergers and for charter 
amendments. Higher values of EINDEXi,t capture weaker 
corporate governance. 
EDUMMYi,t  A missing E-Index indicator variable equal to one if EINDEXi,t 
is missing, and zero otherwise. 
IOi,t  Institutional ownership, defined as the percentage of shares held 
by institutional investors at the end of year t (reported by 
Thomson Reuters). 
ALTMANZi,t  Altman Z score, defined as 3.3*(earnings before interest and 
taxes / total assets) + 0.99*(sales / total assets).) + 0.6*(market 
value of equity / total liabilities)) + 1.2*× (working capital / total 






Table 1: Sample Selection  
Firm-years from 1998 to 2017 that meet the following criteria 
necessary to compute management forecast consistency 
(MFC): issued at least four non-duplicate, point or range annual 
earnings per share (EPS) forecasts over the most recent five 
years (t-4 to t), no change in CEO over the most recent five 
years, and, for each forecast included in MFC, data for the 
corresponding analyst consensus EPS forecast (minimum two 
analysts), actual EPS realization, and stock price as of three 
days prior to the management forecast issuance date. 
 
10,268 
Less:   
Belongs to financial services sector (SIC codes: 6000-
6999) or utility sector (SIC codes: 4910-4939). 
 
(1,687) 
Book-to-market is missing, negative book value, market 
value less than $75 million, stock price less than $1 per 
share, or institutional ownership greater than 100%. 
 
(805) 
Missing data necessary to estimate baseline model.  (1,528) 








Table 2, Panel A: Descriptive Statistics (N=6,248) 
Variable* Mean Std. Q1 Median Q3. 
EFF_CAP -1.3188 1.3649 -1.6480  -0.9301 -0.4644 
MFC 0.6514 0.4766 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
MFA 0.5570 0.4968 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
MFH 4.7361 0.3683 4.5240 4.6868 4.9516 
MFP -0.0024 0.0032 -0.0028 -0.0014 -0.0007 
SIZE 7.6723 1.5382 6.5455 7.6090 8.6643 
AVG_ROA 0.0679 0.0672 0.0362 0.0667 0.1021 
BTM 0.4400 0.2823 0.2424 0.3715 0.5676 
LEV 0.5108 0.1774 0.3909 0.5161 0.6315 
RET 0.1320 0.3662 -0.0935 0.1075 0.3156 
STD_ROA 0.0395 0.0424 0.0140 0.0250 0.0462 
STD_INV 0.0162 0.0171 0.0053 0.0103 0.0201 
STD_RET 0.0903 0.0435 0.0595 0.0800 0.1109 
STD_CFO 0.0366 0.0277 0.0181 0.0289 0.0460 
EP 0.1484 0.3162 -0.0907 0.0654 0.3226 
ICW 0.0432 0.2034 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AQ -0.1067 0.1508 -0.1088 -0.0570 -0.0322 
ANACOV 19.6124 11.8064 10.0000 17.0000 27.0000 
EINDEX 1.5280 1.5104 0.0000 1.0000 3.0000 
EDUMMY 0.3318 0.4709 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 
IO 0.5841 0.3417 0.4037 0.7199 0.8367 
ALTMANZ 4.5525 3.2524 2.5971 3.6827 5.5079 
*All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix. 
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Table 2, Panel B: Descriptive Statistics Comparing Consistent (MFC = 1) and 
Inconsistent (MFC = 0) Firms 
 
All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix.*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  N=4,070 N=2,178   N=4,070 N=2,178  
  MFC=1 MFC=0   MFC=1 MFC=0  
  Mean Mean DIF  Median Median DIF 
EFF_CAP  -1.2713 -1.4075 0.1362***  -0.9124 -0.9731 0.0607
*** 
MFA  0.6108 0.4564 0.1544
***  1.0000 0.0000 1.0000
*** 
MFH  4.7096 4.7856 -0.0760
***  4.6672 4.7274 -0.0602
*** 
MFP  -0.0025 -0.0024 -0.0001  -0.0014 -0.0015 0.0001 
SIZE  7.6492 7.7154 -0.0662  7.5638 7.6675 -0.1037
* 
AVG_ROA  0.0674 0.0689 -0.0015  0.0666 0.0670 -0.0004 
BTM  0.4431 0.4341 0.0090  0.3754 0.3657 0.0097 
LEV  0.5062 0.5192 -0.0130**  0.5157 0.5181 -0.0024
** 
RET  0.1349 0.1266 0.0083  0.1107 0.1044 0.0063 
STD_ROA  0.0384 0.0416 -0.0032***  0.0252 0.0248 0.0004 
STD_INV  0.0160 0.0164 -0.0004  0.0102 0.0107 -0.0005
* 
STD_RET  0.0899 0.0909 -0.0010  0.0798 0.0803 -0.0005 
STD_CFO  0.0359 0.0378 -0.0019**  0.0284 0.0296 -0.0012
** 
EP  0.1478 0.1494 -0.0016  0.0633 0.0690 -0.0057 
ICW  0.0437 0.0422 0.0015  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
AQ  -0.1051 -0.1096 0.0045  -0.0564 -0.0582 0.0018 
ANACOV  19.2017 20.3797 -1.1780
***  17.0000 18.0000 -1.0000
*** 
EINDEX  1.5111 1.5597 -0.0486  1.0000 1.0000 0.0000 
EDUMMY  0.3396 0.3173 0.0223
*  0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
* 
IO  0.5945 0.5647 0.0298
***  0.7209 0.7173 0.0036
* 
ALTMANZ  4.5825 4.4964 0.0861  3.6764 3.7027 -0.0263 
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Table 2, Panel C: Correlation Matrix 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
EFF_CAP 1.00                                           
MFC 0.05*** 1.00                     
MFA 0.07*** 0.15*** 1.00                    
MFH -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.06*** 1.00                   
MFP 0.04*** -0.01 -0.09*** -0.17*** 1.00                  
SIZE 0.15*** -0.02 0.12*** -0.22*** 0.18*** 1.00                 
AVG_ROA -0.08*** -0.01 -0.22*** -0.12*** 0.37*** 0.03** 1.00                
BTM 0.02 0.02 0.05*** 0.10*** -0.30*** -0.11*** -0.41*** 1.00               
LEV 0.07*** -0.03*** 0.09*** -0.09*** -0.06*** 0.43*** -0.19*** -0.16*** 1.00              
RET -0.05*** 0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 0.05*** -0.04*** 0.10*** -0.35*** 0.02 1.00             
STD_ROA -0.04*** -0.04*** 0.07*** 0.13*** -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.20*** 0.04*** -0.13*** -0.04*** 1.00            
STD_INV -0.29*** -0.01 -0.10*** 0.13*** -0.06*** -0.27*** 0.09*** 0.04*** -0.18*** 0.01 0.19*** 1.00           
STD_RET -0.05*** -0.01 -0.03** 0.14*** -0.32*** -0.38*** -0.27*** 0.35*** -0.08*** -0.11*** 0.36*** 0.22*** 1.00          
STD_CFO -0.10*** -0.03** -0.05*** 0.15*** -0.24*** -0.39*** -0.02* 0.02 -0.14*** 0.01 0.50*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 1.00         
EP -0.05*** 0.00 0.03** 0.16*** -0.14*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 0.08*** -0.07*** 0.09*** 0.33*** 0.10*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 1.00        
ICW 0.00 0.00 0.02* 0.09*** -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 0.06*** -0.01 -0.05*** 0.09*** 0.03** 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 1.00       
AQ 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.10*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.03** 0.04*** 0.03** 0.02 -0.15*** -0.04*** -0.03** -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.07*** 1.00      
ANACOV 0.06*** -0.05*** 0.05*** -0.14*** 0.23*** 0.64*** 0.15*** -0.25*** 0.08*** -0.03** -0.04*** -0.02* -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 1.00     
EINDEX 0.06*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.13*** 0.07*** 0.14*** 0.02* 0.02* 0.05*** -0.05*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.03** -0.16*** -0.07*** -0.03** 0.08*** 0.02 1.00    
EDUMMY -0.11*** 0.02* -0.07*** 0.21*** -0.09*** -0.28*** -0.06*** 0.05*** -0.09*** 0.03*** 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.21*** 0.15*** 0.05*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.71*** 1.00   
IO 0.01 0.04*** 0.04*** 0.08*** 0.05*** -0.03** -0.05*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.01 0.05*** -0.06*** -0.02* -0.02 0.10*** 0.00 -0.05*** -0.03** 0.06*** -0.01 1.00  
ALTMANZ -0.12*** 0.01 -0.16*** -0.01 0.20*** -0.29*** 0.51*** -0.33*** -0.58*** 0.16*** 0.06*** 0.17*** -0.03** 0.14*** 0.01 -0.05*** -0.08*** 0.05*** -0.07*** 0.06*** -0.03*** 1.00 
All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 3: The Relation Between Capital Investment Efficiency and Management 
Forecast Consistency  
Y = EFF_CAPt+1       
 Pred. 
Sign 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
MFC + 0.1362***  0.0965**  0.1020*** 
  (2.85)  (2.27)  (2.58) 
MFA      -0.0500 
      (-1.24) 
MFH      -0.1594** 
      (-2.17) 
MFP      6.7877 
      (0.84) 
SIZE      0.0421 
      (1.53) 
AVG_ROA      -0.3731 
      (-0.76) 
BTM      0.0861 
      (0.81) 
LEV      -0.0103 
      (-0.05) 
RET      0.0098 
      (0.15) 
STD_ROA      0.1383 
      (0.20) 
STD_INV      -14.1229*** 
      (-7.31) 
STD_RET      -0.1432 
      (-0.25) 
STD_CFO      -0.6990 
      (-0.65) 
EP      -0.0721 
      (-1.01) 
ICW      0.0345 
      (0.43) 
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AQ      0.2945 
      (0.96) 
ANACOV      0.0000 
      (0.00) 
EINDEX      -0.0068 
      (-0.33) 
EDUMMY      -0.1584* 
      (-1.90) 
IO      -0.1131* 
      (-1.71) 
ALTMANZ      -0.0373*** 
      (-3.37) 
Intercept  -1.4075***  -1.3817***  -0.3172 
  (-27.63)  (-32.06)  (-0.68) 
IND-YR Fixed Effects  NO  YES  YES 
Standard Errors 
Clustered at Firm Level 
 
YES  YES  YES 
N  6248  6248  6248 
adj. R2  0.002  0.165  0.226 
All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 
5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, under a two-tailed t-test. t-statistics are reported in parentheses 





Table 4: The Effect of Information Environment Constraints on the Relation 
Between Capital Investment Efficiency and Management Forecast Consistency.  
 
Panel A: Accruals Quality (AQ)    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.0210  
  (0.41)  
    
MFC*AQ - -0.7461*  
  (-1.93)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.228  
Panel B: Earnings Volatility 
(STD_ROA) 
   
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.0424  
  (0.82)  
    
MFC*STD_ROA + 1.4827*  
  (1.68)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.227  





Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + -0.0518  
  (-0.83)  
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MFC* STD_CFO + 4.1494***  
  (2.80)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.228  
Panel D: Business Segments (BS)    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.1046  
  (0.76)  
    
MFC* BS + 
 
0.0019  
  (0.03)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  5499  
Adj. R2  0.223  
Panel E: Firm Size (SIZE)    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.6624***  
  (3.38)  
    
MFC* SIZE - -0.0728***  
  (-3.10)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
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Adj. R2  0.227  





Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.2406***  
  (3.25)  
    
MFC* ANACOV - -0.0069**  
  (-2.37)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.227  
Accruals quality (AQ) is defined as (-1)*the standard deviation of abnormal accruals over the most recent 
five years (estimated with the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accruals model using the specification suggested 
by McNichols (2002)). Earnings volatility (STD_ROA) is defined as the standard deviation of return on assets 
over the most recent five years. Cash flow volatility (STD_CFO) is defined as standard deviation of operating 
cash flows (scaled by total assets) over the most recent five years. Business segments (BS) is the natural 
logarithm of the number of business segments reported in year t. Firm size (SIZE) is defined as the natural 
logarithm of lagged total assets in year t. Analyst coverage (ANACOV) is defined as the number of analysts 
issuing EPS forecasts for the firm in year t. All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, under a two-tailed t-





Table 5: The Effect of Peer Firm Restatement Events on the Relation Between 
Capital Investment Efficiency and Management Forecast Consistency. 
 
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
    
MFC + -0.1476  
  (-1.06)  
    
MFC*PEER_RS + 0.4774***  
  (2.66)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  1077  
Adj. R2  0.152  
The peer firm restatement event sample consists of observations in “treatment” years (PEER_RS=1), which 
are defined as years t+1 and t+2 relative to a peer firm restatement event in year t (EFF_CAP is measured in 
years t+2 and t+3 respectively) and observations in “control” years (PEER _RS=0), which are defined as 
years t and t-1 relative to a peer firm restatement event in year t (EFF_CAP is measured in years t+1 and t, 
respectively). The peer firm restatement sample is selected from the Audit Analytics’ Non-Reliance 
Restatement database using “fraudulent” (RES_FRAUD=1) restatements of annual reporting over at least 
one year. In cases where an industry peer restates multiple times over the sample period, only observations 
related to the first restatement event are used and if one of these observations overlaps with a subsequent 
event observation, it is excluded from the sample. All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix. 
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, under a two-
tailed t-test. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered 





Table 6: The Effect of Financial Resource Availability on the Relation Between 
Capital Investment Efficiency and Management Forecast Consistency. 
 
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
    
MFC  0.0491  
  (0.79)  
    
MFC* FinanciallyConstrained  0.1562*  
  (1.81)  
    
MFC*FinanciallyUnconstrained  -0.0319  
  (-0.32)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  
Standard Errors Clustered at Firm Level  YES  
N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.227  
FinanciallyConstrained (FinanciallyUnconstrained) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm’s financial 
resource availability ranking is in the bottom (top) tercile in year t, and zero otherwise. We determine a firm’s 
financial resource availability ranking by taking the average rank of (decile) ranked measures of a firm’s cash 
balance and negative leverage (we rank negative leverage so that liquidity is increasing in ranks, as it is with 
cash). All baseline model variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, under a two-tailed t-test. t-statistics are reported in 




Table 7: The Effect of Firm Growth Opportunities on the Relation Between 
Capital Investment Efficiency and Management Forecast Consistency. 
Panel A: Firm Age    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.18869***  
  (3.06)  
    
MFC* AGE - -0.00335**  
  (-2.13)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.226  
Panel B: Operating Life Cycle    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.36548**  
  (2.21)  
    
MFC* LIFECYCLE - -0.09448*  
  (-1.74)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6245  
Adj. R2  0.226  
Panel C: Dividend Payout Ratio    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.13729***  
  (3.15)  
    
MFC* PAYOUT_RATIO - -0.18250**  
  (-2.32)  
56 
 
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6240  
Adj. R2  0.224  
Panel D: Sales Growth    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.08012**  
  (1.99)  
    
MFC* SALES_GROWTH + 0.23082*  
  (1.87)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.226  
AGE is firm age, defined as year t minus the year that the firm first appears in the CRSP database. 
LIFECYCLE is the firm’s operating life cycle stage, defined as 1 if the firm is in the “introduction” stage, 2 
if the firm is in the “growth” stage, 3 if the firm is in the “mature” stage, 4 if the firm is in the “shake-out” 
stage, and 5 if the firm is in the “decline” stage based on the cash flow statement methodology used in 
Dickinson (2011). PAYOUT_RATIO is the dividend payout ratio, defined as cash dividends per share devided 
by primary earnings per share before extraordinary items (Gul 1999). SALES_GROWTH is firm sales growth, 
defined as the change in sales in year t divided by lagged total assets. All baseline variables are defined in 
the Appendix. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, 
under a two-tailed t-test. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors 





Table 8: The Effect of Weak Corporate Governance on the Relation Between 
Capital Investment Efficiency and Management Forecast Consistency. 
Panel A: Governance Index    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.1456**  
  (2.42)  
    
MFC* GINDEX + -0.0073  
  (-1.11)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.226  
Panel B: Entrenchment Index    
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.1409**  
  (2.58)  
    
MFC* EINDEX + -0.0252  
  (-1.11)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  6248  
Adj. R2  0.226  
Panel C : Corporate Governance 
Principal Component 
   
Y=EFF_CAPt+1    
MFC + 0.0919**  
  (2.24)  
    
MFC* CGPCA + 0.0379  
58 
 
  (0.62)  
Controls  YES  
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES  





N  5754  
Adj. R2  0.224  
GINDEX is the Governance Index developed by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), defined as the number 
of shareholder rights-decreasing provisions (ranging from 0 to 24) listed in the database compiled by the 
Investor Responsibility Resource Center (IRRC). EINDEX is the Entrenchment Index developed by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009), defined as the number of entrenchment items listed in the database compiled by 
the IRRC. CGPCA is the corporate governance measure developed by Gillan, Hartzel, and Stark (2011), 
defined as the first principal component derived from an analysis of board size, CEO duality, the presence of 
a lead independent director, the presence of a governance committee, and the percentage of independent 
directors sitting on the board. As each corporate governance variable increases, corporate goverance is 
expected to become weaker. All baseline variables are defined in the Appendix. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, under a two-tailed t-test. t-





Table 9: The Relation Between Changes in Capital Investment Efficiency and 
Changes in Management Forecast Consistency. 
Y=CHG_EFF_CAPt+1  
   
   
CHG_MFCt + 0.1255** 
  (2.19) 
   
Controls in first difference   YES 
IND-YR Fixed Effects  YES 




N  4878 
Adj- R2  0.084 
CHG_EFF_CAPt+1 is the first difference of capital investment inefficiency (EFF_CAPt+1 – EFF_CAPt). CHG_MFCt 
is the first difference of management forecast consistency (MFCt – MFCt-1). All baseline model control variables are 
defined analogously. See the Appendix for baseline model variable definitions in levels. *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively, under a two-tailed t-test. t-statistics are in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
 
 
 
 
